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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 12

Julie K. Anderson
Anderson Family Assocs. v. Hugh Ricci, P.E., 179 P.3d 1201 (Nev.
2008) (holding that although vested water rights are subject to state
regulation under Nevada law, an application for a change of use permit does not subject the water rights to an impairment statute because
vested rights cannot be impaired or diminished in value unless intentionally abandoned).
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether Carson City
("City") lost priority on certain vested water rights after the State Engineer canceled the City's change of use permit application. Both the
City and Anderson Family Associates ("AFA") own water rights in Ash
Canyon Creek. The Ash Canyon Creek waters were originally granted
as part of an 1885 court decree.
After obtaining additional water rights in Ash Canyon Creek, the
City applied for a change of use permit to exercise the rights. However, the City failed to fulfill the permit's conditions. The State Engineer
canceled the permit, but later reinstated it once the City satisfied the
conditions. AFA then petitioned the State Engineer, contending that
the City's water rights were subject to Nevada Revised Statute §
533.395, which provides that the cancellation of a permit replaces the
original appropriation date with the date the petitioner filed the petition to rescind the cancellation. The State Engineer disagreed, answering that Nevada Revised Statute § 533.085(1), Nevada's nonimpairment statute, prohibited him from applying § 533.395 to the City's
water rights because the rights had vested before Nevada enacted the
current statutory code. AFA petitioned the district court for judicial
review of the State Engineer's decision, but the district court denied
AFA's petition. This appeal followed.
The court first discussed the general framework of water rights in
Nevada. Appropriators can hold one of three types of water rights:
vested, permitted, or certificated. The court defined vested rights as
those that existed under Nevada common law, before the enactment of
Nevada Revised Statute Chapter 533 in 1913. The State Engineer
grants permitted rights. Certificated rights are perfected permitted
rights. The court held that vested rights are not subject to Nevada's
Statutory Rights provisions because they were decreed before such
provisions were enacted. Additionally, the court held that vested, prestatutory rights can only be lost through intentional abandonment.
In support of its position, the court relied on several previous Nevada opinions. Citing Ormsby County v. Kearney, the court explained
that although vested rights are subject to state regulation, no one can
impair or diminish in value such rights. Additionally, relying on In re
Waters of Manse Spring, the court explained that one who acquired
rights before 1913 can only lose them through intentional abandonment. Thus, because the City's rights were decreed in 1885 and had
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not been abandoned, the Court found that they were exempt from any
loss of priority provision.
The court rejected AFA's claim that law as presented in DesertIrrigation, Ltd. v. State of Nevada controlled. Although the Desert Irrigation
holding supported AFA's claim that the City should suffer a loss of
priority as a result of a canceled permit, the court clarified that the
holding applies only to certificated water rights and not vested, prestatutory rights.
Because Nevada case law supported its construction of §
533.085(1), and there was no evidence of intentional abandonment by
the City, the court affirmed the State Engineer's decision.
Allison Graboski
NEWJERSEY
In re Stream Encroachment Permit, 955 A.2d 964 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

Div. 2008) (holding that the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection may place conditions on permits for projects that are highly
complex, and that the wetlands area in question was not a "waterway"
under the statute because it could not support any water-dependent
use).
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
("NJDEP") approved The Mills Corporation and Mack-Cali Realty Corporation's (jointly "Mills") joint application for various permits in connection with the Meadowlands Xanadu development project. The
Sierra Club, New Jersey Environmental Federation, and New Jersey
Public Interest Research Group (collectively "Sierra") and Hartz
Mountain Industries ("Hartz") appealed the NJDEP's approval. The
mixed-use project required Mills to fill in 7.69 acres of wetlands. As
part of the application process, Mills made an original submission of
information, supplemental submissions, and made available an environmental report. Additionally, the NJDEP held a public hearing. On
October 4, 2004, the NJDEP approved the permits subject to certain
conditions. Sierra and Hartz filed appeals with the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.
On appeal, Hartz and Sierra argued that the NJDEP did not use
sufficient facts to approve the permits and that regulations prohibited
the NJDEP from issuing conditional permits. In determining whether
there was a sufficient factual basis for NJDEP's approval, the court
found because Mills and associated groups submitted numerous original materials, numerous supplemental reports, a report concerning
the environmental concerns of the project, and because the NJDEP
held a public hearing and a comment period, that a sufficient factual
basis did exist for the NJDEP to consider and grant the permits. The
court further determined that although it may not have agreed with all
of the NJDEP's conclusions, because the NJDEP based the conclusions

